Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

State of Utah v. Peggy B. Johnson : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald J. Yengich; Attorney for Respondent.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; David B. Thompson; Assistant Attorney General; Charlene
Barlow; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Utah v. Johnson, No. 900088.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2884

This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

DOCUMENT

U , A H SU

P*EME COURI

KFU

9

S

DOCKET NO

BRIT

qooosf*

IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
l

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,
v.

:

Case No. 900088

t

PEGGY B. JOHNSON,

:

Defendant-Respondent.

Category No. 2

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159)
Assistant Attorney General
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Petitioner

RONALD J. YENGICH
175 East 400 South #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent

FILED
NOV 1 5 1991
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

*

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

:

v.

:

PEGGY B. JOHNSON,

:

Defendant-Respondent.

Case No. 900088

Category No. 2

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159)
Assistant Attorney General
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Petitioner

RONALD J. YENGICH
175 East 400 South #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING .

STATEMEN1

FfiE FACTS
\TTTMENr

STTMMAR

INTRODUCTION
ARGUMENT

IN REVERSING
DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION
OF
ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER ON COUNT III,
WHICH WAS BASED ON DEFENDANT'S ATTEMPT TO KILL
HER HUSBAND BY ADMINISTERING OXALIC ACID TO
HIM, THE COURT MISINTERPRETED UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76-4-101(3)(b) AND 76-5-202(1)(n) (1990)
AND OVERLOOKED STATE V. PAPPAS. 707 P.2D 1169
(UTAH 1989)

CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Cummins v. Nielson. 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913)

2

Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 679 P.2d 903
(Utah 1984)

9

State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)

9

State v. Hamblin. 676 P.2d 376 (Utah 1983)

9

State v. Johnson. No. 900088 (Utah Nov. 1, 1991)

. . . . 2, 3, 8

State v. Pappas. 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1989)

1-3, 5, 6

State v. Pearson. 680 P.2d 406 (Utah 1984)

4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990)

1-4, 6, 8, 9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990)

1-4, 6, 8, 9

Utah R. App. P. 35

10

-ii-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner, :
v.

:

PEGGY B. JOHNSON,

*

Case No. 900088

Category No. 2

Defendant-Respondent. :
PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing
is whether the Court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4101(3)(b) and 76-5-202(1)(n) (1990) and overlooked State v.
Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah 1989), in reversing defendant's
conviction of attempted first degree murder based on the
administration of oxalic acid to her husband.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement
of the case is generally sufficient:
Defendant Peggy B. Johnson was charged
with three separate counts of attempted first
degree murder of her husband, Danny Johnson,
and one count of distribution of a controlled
substance for value. With respect to the
attempted murder charges, count I charged an
attempt to use heroin to cause her husband's
death, and counts II and III charged attempts
to use, respectively, amphetamines and oxalic
acid to achieve the same end. Johnson was
found guilty on all three counts and was also
found guilty of distribution of a controlled
substance for value. She was sentenced to

three concurrent prison terms of five years
to life.
State v. Johnson. No. 900088, slip op. at 1 (Utah Nov. 1, 1991)
(a copy of the full opinion is attached as an addendum).

On

appeal, the Court affirmed the conviction of attempted first
degree murder1 on count I but reversed the convictions for the
same offense on counts II and III.

Ibid.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts pertinent to this petition are set forth in
the Statement of the Case, above, or in the argument portion of
this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In reversing defendant's conviction of attempted first
degree murder on count III, which was based on defendant's
attempt to kill her husband by administering oxalic acid to him,
the Court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. SS 76-4-101(3)(b) and 765-202(1)(n) and overlooked State v. Pappas, 707 P.2d 1169 (Utah
1989), which makes clear that Utah's attempt statute, which
rejects the defense of impossibility, focuses primarily on an
actor's subjective criminality.
INTRODUCTION
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court
has misinterpreted or overlooked the relevant law.

See Cummins

v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913).

The

atgtuttfeAt portion 6f this brief will demonstrate that the State's
1
First degree murder is now designated "aggravated murder."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1991). All references in this
brief are to first degree murder as defined in Utah Code Ann.
S 76-5-202 (1990), under which defendant was convicted.
2

petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and should be
granted.
ARGUMENT
IN REVERSING DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF
ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER ON COUNT III,
WHICH WAS BASED ON DEFENDANT'S ATTEMPT TO
KILL HER HUSBAND BY ADMINISTERING OXALIC ACID
TO HIM, THE COURT MISINTERPRETED UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 76-4-101(3)(b) AND 76-5-202(1)(n)
(1990) AND OVERLOOKED STATE V. PAPPAS, 707
P.2D 1169 (UTAH 1989).
In reversing defendant's conviction of attempted first
degree murder on count III, the Court concluded that, although
the State had proved at trial the requisite mental state and the
requisite "substantial step" for attempted first degree murder,
it had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "oxalic
acid is a poison or a lethal substance" or to present sufficient
evidence "as to the quantity of oxalic acid that would constitute
a lethal dose, much less that [defendant] attempted to administer
such an amount."

Johnson, slip op. at 9.

The Court rejected the

State's argument that under Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3)(b)
(1990) —

which provides that no defense to an attempt crime

arises "[d]ue to factual or legal impossibility if the offense
could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as
the actor believed them to be" —

the prosecution was required to

prove only that defendant believed that oxalic acid was a poison
or a lethal substance, or that she was administering it in a
lethal dose. Id. at 9-10.

It stated that M[w]here the charge is

attempted first degree murder, which is distinguishable under
section 76-5-202(1) from attempted second degree murder only by
3

the presence of specified objective aggravating circumstances,
the legislature must have intended that the aggravating
circumstance actually be present."

jDd. at 10.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court overlooked the
basic policy considerations which underpin Utah's attempt statute
and its rejection of the impossibility defense.

The Court also

misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202(1)(n) (1990) in the
context of attempted first degree murder.
The attempt statute, section 76-4-101, is derived from
the Model Penal Code.

State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah

1984) (per curiam); Model Penal Code, art. 5, § 5.01 (1985)
(hereafter "MPC" ) 2 .

The MPC rejects the defense of

impossibility "by providing that the defendant's conduct should
be measured according to the circumstances as he believes them to
be, rather than the circumstances as they may have existed in
fact."

MPC, art. 5, § 5.01 comment 3, at 307. Utah's criminal

code likewise rejects the impossibility defense.

The MPC

criticizes the approach of some courts which find no attempt
where, in light of the actual facts, it was impossible for the
2

Section 5.01 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the crime, he
(a) purposely engages in conduct that
would constitute the crime if the
attendant circumstances were as he
believes them to be[.]
•

• • •

4

defendant to commit the crime, Bven though the defendant fully
intended to commit the crime:
The primary rationale of these decisions
is that, judging the actor's conduct in the
light of the actual facts, what he intended
to do did not amount to a crime. This
approach, however, is unsound in that it
seeks to evaluate a mental attitude—"intent
or purpose"—not looking to the actor's
mental frame of reference, but to a situation
wholly at variance with the actor's beliefs.
In so doing, the courts exonerate defendants
in situations where attempt liability most
certainly should be imposed. In all of these
cases the actor's criminal purpose has been
clearly demonstrated; he went as far as he
could in implementing that purpose; and, as a
result, his "dangerousness" is plainly
manifested.
Id. at 308-09 (footnote omitted).
With respect to attempted murder, while "[s]ome early
decisions exculpated the actor of attempted murder if the
instrumentality selected was not adequate for committing the
crime contemplated, . . . the general rule today is that one can
be guilty of an attempt to murder although the gun or poison or
bomb is incapable of producing death."
omitted).

Id., at 311-12 (footnotes

See also LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law

S 6.3, at 42-43 (1986).
As this Court noted in State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169,
1172 (Utah 1985), "[m]odern criminal jurisprudence has a very
clear bias toward punishing an actor's intent instead of simply
punishing the manifest criminality or outwardly criminal act,"
and "[o]ur Legislature has expressed that its concern is directed
more toward subjective criminality than toward manifest

5

criminality . • • •"

The legislature's "desire to punish

subjective criminality so long as it is linked with some
otherwise harmless corroborative act that demonstrates the
firmness of the actor's criminal resolve" is exemplified in
section 76-4-101(3)(b)'s denial of an impossibility defense to an
attempt charge.

Pappas. 705 P.2d at 1172.

In short, under

Utah's attempt statute, which is derived from the MPC, the
actor's subjective mental state is the primary determinant of
criminal liability, and the level of punishment imposed depends
on the degree of culpability associated with a particular mental
state.
With the foregoing principles of attempt law in mind,
this Court's reversal of defendant's first degree murder
conviction on count III can now be examined.

First, the

legislature has determined that an intentional or knowing killing
accomplished by certain instrumentalities —

i.e., poison

(including "any lethal substance or . . . any substance
administered in a lethal amount, dosage, or quantity")3 or a
bomb-like device —

is first degree murder.

5-202(1)(1) & (n) (1990).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-

The intentional or knowing use of one

of these intrumentalities to cause the death of another makes the
murder a first degree murder rather than a second degree murder.
For whatever reason, the legislature determined that the use of a

3

Throughout this brief, the State will generally use only
the term "poison" to refer to a poison, a lethal substance, or
any substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage, or
quantity (see § 76-5-202(1)(n)).

6

poison or a bomb to kill another is a more egregious form of
murder.

And, its obvious intent is to punish the actor who

decides to use a poison or a bomb more severely than the actor
who, for example, uses a gun or a knife to kill.
That legislative intent seems equally obvious in the
attempt context, where, although death does not result, the
identical intent to use a poison or a bomb is present.
Furthermore, under Utah's attempt statute, which rejects the
impossibility defense, the fact that the substance administered
is not actually a poison, or that the device is not actually a
functional bomb capable of causing death, does not insulate from
a higher degree of criminal liability the actor who believes the
substance is a poison or the device is a functional bomb.
is so because Utah's statute seeks to punish

This

subjective

criminality, the actor's criminal mental state, not simply the
outwardly criminal act.

The actor who attempts to kill with what

he mistakenly believes to be a poison or a bomb has a mental
state as culpable as that of an actor who attempts to kill with
something that is in fact a poison or a bomb.

Indeed, beyond the

mistaken belief as to the true character of the substance or
device, each actor has precisely the seune mental state and thus
is equally dangerous.4
In the instant case, this Court concluded that a
subjective mistake by the actor that the substance used in an
4

This is also the same culpable mental state possessed by
the actor who succeeds in causing a death and is guilty of the
completed crime of first degree murder.
7

attempt to kill was actually a poison or was administered in a
lethal dose "would be a defense to a charge of attempted first
degree murder•"

Johnson, slip op. at 10. This conclusion

overlooks the principle that the primary determinant of attempt
liability is the actor's subjective mental state.

It also

overlooks the clear distinction in culpability the legislature
has drawn between the actor who intends to kill by administering
poison to another and the actor who intends to kill by using some
other instrumentality.

Because the mental state of the actor who

attempts to kill with what he mistakenly believes is poison is as
culpable as the mental state of the actor who attempts to kill
with what is in fact poison (i.e., both intend to use poison to
cause the death of another), this Court has no basis for
concluding that "where the charge is attempted first degree
murder, which is distinguishable under section 76-5-202(1) from
attempted second degree murder only by the presence of specified
objective aggravating circumstances, the legislature must have
intended that the aggravating circumstance actually be present."
Johnson, slip op. at 10. That conclusion is inconsistent with
the attempt statute's focus on subjective criminality and the
legislature's decision to designate murder by poison as first
degree murder.

The net result of the Court's holding is a

nullification of section 76-4-101(3)(b) for purposes of attempted
first degree murder under section 76-5-202(1)(n), and an
elimination of the critical distinction between the actor who
intends to kill by poison and the actor who intends to kill by

8

some other instrumentality the legislature has

segregated out

I:or ibfjM»i ;;,ic"iI t r e a t m e n t

*

•"

impossibility defense in the face of a statute which explicitly
rejects that defense and

the absence of any Indication that

the legislate ire i ntended : , .
76-5-202(1)(n)

statute in i in apply i fcieuiiun

ThIs Is contrary to the well established

principles that the Court's "primary responsibility in construing
legislative enactments is to give effec t to the legislature's
underlying intent" State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah
I 4 H I ) ( i : j 1 a 1 111 in in • DIII i I

in in! I I I

legislature's true i •

I

1 1 e u i < I e n c <' o f

IIm

and purpose .H the plain language ..

the statute, Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 p.2d
ill:)03

906 (1 1 1: i i i 1 I 11 98 1)

See a lso State v. Bishoi

9,

495 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman,. I! , concurring i n the result)
(relying

language of statute to conclude that

legislature intended a bifurcated procedure under

version

section 76-5-404.1(3)(g)).
Accordingly, the Court shoi
reinstate defendant's convictioi

rehear inq ai ij

first degree murder on count

III, with the recognition that, to establish guilt of attempted
f i r s I::, degree
the State needed to prove only that defendant believed
acid she administered

the oxalic

her husband was either a poison or given
hi f J" e c o iiei e> »' i deinm,:e c" I! e a i; I \ » s uf >po r L s ) .

For the reasons discussed above, the impossibility defense cannot
operate to convert defendant's attempted first degree murder
9

conviction to an attempted second degree murder conviction.
Utah's attempt and first degree murder statutes, and the
underlying legislative intent, simply do not allow for such a
result,
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant
rehearing and modify its opinion to confonri to Utah law.

Utah R.

App. P. 35(c).
The State certifies that this petition is presented in
**

good faith and not for delay.

.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this / £ ^ 5 a y of November, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
ff
Assistant Attorney General

CHARLENK BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendant Peggy B. Johnson was charged with three
separate counts of attempted first degree murder of her
husband, Danny Johnson, and one count of distribution ^ a
controlled substance for value. With respect to the
attempted murder charges, count I charged an attempt \
heroin to cause her husband's death, and counts II and III
charged attempts to use, respectively, amphetamines and
oxalic acid to achieve the same end. Johnson was found
guilty on all three counts and was also found guilty of
distribution of a controlled substance for value. She was
sentenced to three concurrent prison terms of five years to
life. Johnson appeals from the three attempted murder
convictions but does not appeal from the distribution
conviction. We affirm the attempted first degree murder
conviction on count I, based on the administration of
heroin. We reverse the conviction on count III, based on the
administration of oxalic acid, but find sufficient evidence
to support a conviction of attempted second degree murder on
that count. We reverse the conviction on count IT. whirh is
grounded on the administration of amphetamines.
On appeal, we view the record facts in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, £&£, e.g.. State v. v^rd*.
770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989); State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342,
345 (Utah 1985), and we recite the facts accordingly.

Prior to her convictions, Peggy Johnson owned The
Shack, a bar in Willard, Utah. She also worked as a bail
bondswoman and 3 constable. In approximately 1982, Johnson
met Cindy Orozco when she bailed Orozco out of the Box Elder
County jail. Johnson and Orozco had various other contacts,
at least one of which involved Johnson's bailing Orozco out
of jail a second time. Orozco apparently never fully paid
Johnson for her bail bond services.
In December 1987, Johnson contacted Orozco to talk
about how Orozco could recover a guitar and stereo that
Orozco's husband Richard (nicknamed Penny), had given Johnson
as collateral for a bail bond. Later in December, Johnson
met with Cindy and Penny Orozco. At trial, Cindy Orozco
testified that during this meeting Johnson indicated a desire
to "get rid of her husband" because they were having
problems. Johnson asked the Orozcos if they knew of a drug
on which a person could overdose.
Johnson again met with Cindy and Penny Orozco in
early January 1988. Johnson told Cindy that Danny had been
beating her, that he had a girlfriend, and that she was under
a lot of stress. Johnson further explained that she did not
want to divorce her husband because he would get half of her
inheritance. Cindy testified that Johnson had concluded that
the easiest way to get rid of Danny was to "overdose him."
To that end, Johnson wanted the Orozcos to provide her with
heroin. Cindy Orozco told Johnson that it would cost $300 to
purchase enough heroin to cause an overdose. The Orozcos and
Johnson then went to procure the drug. After dropping Penny
and Johnson off at a bar, Cindy Orozco attempted to buy the
heroin, but was unable to do so at the time. The Orozcos
eventually used the $300 to purchase cocaine for their own
use.
During the following week, after Cindy Orozco
admitted to Johnson that she had used the money to purchase
drugs for herself, Johnson continued to seek Cindy's
assistance in obtaining drugs to administer to her husband.
Although Cindy was somewhat hesitant, she agreed to provide
Johnson with drugs after Johnson brought her daughter to the
Orozcos* house and had her describe her father's abuse of her
mother.
On or about January 21, 1988, Johnson gave Orozco an
additional $450 to buy heroin. Orozco purchased the heroin
and gave it to Johnson. Three days later, Orozco went to
Johnson's house to borrow some money to purchase drugs for
her husband, Penny. Johnson told Orozco that she could not
lend her any money because Danny would get upset. During
this conversation, Orozco testified that Johnson then told
her that the "stuff [indicating the heroin] didn't work."

No. 900088
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i)iI January 27, 1988, Orozco met with Officer Marci
Vaughn of the Ogden Police Department and offered to help
"make a drug bust* in return for leniency on a theft charge.
Officer Vaughn confronted Orozco with information she had
learned from Orozco's parole officer concerning statements
Orozco had made about Johnson's apparent attempt to kill her
husband. Orozco then agreed to cooperate with Officer Steve
Vojtecky of the Utah Division of Investigations in his
investigation of the allegations against Johnson,
On January 28, 1988, at Officer Vojtecky's direction,
Orozco telephoned Johnson at The Shack, Officers recorded
the conversation. Johnson told Orozco she had a "new idea"
but that she could not talk about it in her husband's
presence. Later the same day, Orozco called Johnson at her
home, but Johnson refused to talk about the "new idea" over
the phone.
The next day, uto^co went to Johnson's house wearing
a body microphone. Officer Vojtecky recorded the conversation
from outside the house. During this conversation, Johnson
asked if Orozco knew where to get some "crank"—a street name
for methamphetamine, Johnson explained that she had seen a
television program that indicated that a person could be
killed by taking too much crank. Johnson then told Orozco
that she had administered various other substances to her
husband, a! ] of whi ch had. failed to kill him,.. 1
1. The transcript of the recorded conversation, which was
introduced at trial, provides in part:
Johnson: (inaudible) I can't believe all
this shit hasn't done anything.
•Orozco:
Well, what all
what all
have you like tried and stuff ?
Johnson: rhat that I got from you.
Orozco:
f'eah
Johnson: And amoi
i mox I 11 . . .
acid • . *
Orozco:
Amoxlic acid?
Johnson: Uh-huh. A whole botti
*-Orozco:
A whole bottle of it?
Johnson: Sfou know, he's been taking the
capsules . . . about that much
every day. Tried a whole thing
for thirty days and uh-huh.
Decon. Didn't work. And this
stuff. Looked it up here in the
encyclopedia.
Orozco:
How do you pronounce it?
Johnson: Oxalic. Oxalic.
Orozco:
Hmmm. He's ??? Tricky.
Johnson: "—•( t ' ( i n I i inn. 1 "!! i in |idiMijitj

3

"III ]i

No.

900088

After Orozco left the house/ Vojtecky requested that
she go back and ask Johnson for money to buy the crank and to
explain how she intended to administer the drug. In response
to Orozco-s inquiry, Johnson replied that she planned to put
it in capsules. In a telephone conversation the same day,
Johnson agreed to meet Orozco at Orozco's house and to bring
money for the crank. On January 30, 1988, Johnson arrived at
the house and spoke with Orozcor who was once again wearing a
body microphone, and Vojtecky, who was acting as Orozco's
boyfriend. During this conversation, Johnson asked how she
should administer the crank and inquired whether she could put
it in her husband's coffee. Johnson explained that she
planned to administer it to him in this manner one night when
he came home. Vojtecky informed her that the crank would kill
him and asked if that's what she wanted. Johnson replied,
••This sounds horrible, but yes.w Johnson then gave Vojtecky
$500 to purchase the crank.
Also during this conversation, Johnson discussed her
prior attempts to poison her husband. She told Vojtecky that
she had already used most of a bottle of oxalic acid in her
husband's capsules over the previous month and that he was
still taking capsules containing oxalic acid everyday. She
stated that she gave her husband an entire box of Decon in
capsules that he had taken over a one-month period. She
further explained how she had put the heroin in a capsule on
January 21 and given it to her husband personally. She
explained that none of these attempts had worked.
Later that evening, Vojtecky and Orozco met Johnson
in Willard, Utah, and gave her some counterfeit crank made of
brown sugar and flour. Vojtecky testified that Johnson
(Footnote 1 continued.)
Orozco:
I know. I can see that. And
it's . . . it's crystal?
Johnson: Yeah.
Orozco:
What do they usually use it for?
Johnson: Taking the paint off (inaudible)•
Orozco:
Takin' the what?
Johnson: Paint off metal.
Orozco:
Off metal?
Johnson: Yeah.
Orozco:
Hmmm. So crank, huh? Well, I
don't know. I guess I could
probably get back with ya. I
might . • . I maybe can, you
know, know someone.
Johnson: I don't think coke will do it.
I don't think he'd do enough of
that. And if you could get
heroin liquid and everything,
how much would that take?

No. 900088

4

appeared to put the counterfeit crank under her dashboard.
When other officers stopped Johnson's car a short time later,
however, they were unabl e to find any of the substance.
AL trial, the State produced evidence that supported
this version of the facts. Specifically, subsequent tests
performed on the capsules that Danny ingested showed that
they contained the same substance as the bottle in the
Johnson home labeled "oxalic acid.* Danny Johnson testified
at trial that he had been taking the capsules for a month and
that he had noticed stomach cramps, weakness, and a burning
sensation in his throat on at least one occasion after taking
a pill. Danny also testified that his wife had given him a
capsule before he went to bed on the night of January 21, the
same night:, according to his wife's statement to the
undercover officer, that she had put heroin in his capsules
He testified that he awoke at approximately 6 a.m. with
stomach discomfort and dizziness. He also testified that he
had broken out in a cold sweat and that he vomited the
morning after taking the capsules.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three
counts of attempted first degree murder. Each count alleged
that Johnson attempted to cause the death of her husband
through the administration of poison or a lethal substance or
a substance in a lethal amount for the purpose of pecuniary
or other personal gain. The jury also convicted Johnson on a
fourth count of distribution of a controlled substance for
value. After trial, Johnson retained new counsel, who
immediately filed a motion for a new trial. The court denied
the motion, and this appeal followed.
Johnson challenges her conviction wn «xA ^; *
counts of attempted first degree murder, relying on two
grounds. First, she contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support a verdict of guilty. Second, she
claims that statements she made to the Orozcos and the
undercover investigators concerning the alleged crimes were
admitted improperly because the State had failed first to
show independent evidence of a corpus delicti. See State v.
Weidon, 6 I Itah 2d 372, 31 4 P 2d 353 (] 957)
We first consider the insufficiency of t:l le evidence
claims as to each count. The appropriate standard of review
is as follows:
In considering a claim of insufficiency of
the evidence, "we review the evidence and
all inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a
jury conviction for insufficient evidence
only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficientlv inconclusive or inherently
5
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improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he
[or she] was convicted."
State v, Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989) (quoting State
v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)). We note that the
trial court considered defendants insufficiency of the
evidence claim in denying the motion for a new trial. This
action lends further weight to the jury's verdict. See
generally State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985)
(acknowledging that trial court has discretion in granting or
denying motions for new trials in criminal cases); State v.
Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 561, 6 P.2d 167, 169 (1931); State v.
Mellor, 73 Utah 104, 116, 272 P. 635, 639 (1928).
Moving to the merits of the sufficiency challenges,
the elements of the crime charged are drawn from two statutes,
the attempt statute and the first degree murder statute. To
be guilty of an attempt, the actor must engage "in conduct
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the
offense" with the mental state -otherwise required for the
commission of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1)
(1990).2 To be guilty of first degree (or capital) murder,
the actor must commit what would otherwise be a second degree
murder, i.e., "intentionally or knowingly" cause the death of
another, and in addition, must do so under circumstances where
at least one of several aggravating factors listed in the
statute is shown to be present. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202
2.

The attempt statute provides:
(1) For purposes of this part a
person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, he [or she]
engages in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward commission of the
offense.
(2) For purposes of this part,
conduct does not constitute a substantial
step unless it is strongly corroborative
of the actor's intent to commit the
offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of
attempt shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was
actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal
impossibility if the offense could have
been committed had the attendant
circumstances been as the actor believed
them to be.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990).
No. 900088
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(1990). Here, the State relied on two of the listed
aggravating factors: first, the commission of a homicide "by
means of the administration of a poison or of any lethal
substance or of any substance administered in a lethal
amount/ dosage, or quantity," Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-202(1)(n) (1990), and second, the commission of a
homicide "for pecuniary or other personal gain." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-202(l)(f) (1990).
To summarize, in order to convict Peggy Johnson of
attempted first degree murder, the State had the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the following: (i) she had
the intent to kill or knowledge that her acts would result in
death if carried out; (ii) she engaged in conduct constituting
a substantial step toward causing the death of her husband,
and (iii) she did so either (a) by administering or attempting
to administer a "poison . . . or lethal substance or . . .
[a] substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage, or
quantity" or (b) "for pecuniary or other personal gain."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1990); Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-202(1)(n); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(f); £££
State v. Castonouav, 663 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1983). We
will consider Johnson's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge
to her convictions on each of the three counts separately.
We first address count II. That count alleges that
Johnson attempted to cause her husband's death by administering methamphetamines. We assume, without deciding, that
evidence of the requisite intent to kill is present.
However, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence for
a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson's
actions amounted to a "substantial step" toward commission of
first degree murder by administration of methamphetamine.
The State argues that Johnson's giving $500 to
Vojtecky to purchase the counterfeit crank constitutes a
"substantial step" toward commission of the crime. We
disagree. In order for conduct to constitute a substantial
step, there must be more than mere preparation. See State v.
Castongugy/ 663 P.2d at 1326; State v. Otto, 629 P.2d 646,
647 (Idaho 1981). All that is shown from the record is that
Johnson purchased counterfeit crank from undercover
officers. There is no showing that she attempted to
administer the substance. Indeed, there is no evidence as to
what she did or attempted to do with it. She may have used
it herself or simply disposed of it. When the police pulled
her car over after she purchased the "crank," officers did
not find any counterfeit crank in her car or on her person.
The mere purchase of the counterfeit crank from an undercover
officer does not go beyond preparation and therefore is not
the substantial step needed to support a conviction for
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attempted first degree murder. See Otto. €29 P.2d at 650
(solicitation of hit man not substantial step).3
Because there is insufficient evidence to support a
rinding of substantial step on count II, there is no need for
us to consider the evidence regarding either of the charged
aggravating circumstances that would elevate the attempted
second degree murder charge to a first. We reverse Johnson's
conviction under count II.
Johnson also challenges her conviction under count
III, which alleges that she attempted to kill her husband by
administering oxalic acid. As with count II, the State must
have proven the requisite mental state, the requisite
conduct, and the requisite aggravating circumstance. As to
the first element, there is sufficient evidence to show that
Johnson had the requisite state of mind. Johnson indicated
to Orozco that she had given her husband an entire bottle of
oxalic acid in small doses in his ampicillin capsules.
Johnson made this statement during a conversation with Orozco
in which they were discussing how large a dose of heroin
would be fatal.4 The jury could certainly infer from these
statements and others that Johnson had made about failed
attempts to poison her husband that Johnson administered the
oxalic acid with the necessary intent or knowledge.
As for the second element of the attempt charge, the
question is whether the evidence was sufficient to support
the jury's finding that Johnson's conduct constituted a
substantial step toward the commission of murder. There is
no question that there was evidence sufficient to show that
Johnson actually administered the oxalic acid to her
husband. Johnson's statements about giving her husband an
3. The fact that the counterfeit crank was harmless does not
figure in our determination that its purchase failed to
establish a substantial step toward the commission of the
crime. Indeed, as the State points out, impossibility is no
defense to an attempt in Utah. Section 76-4-101(3)(b)
provides:
(3) No defense to the offense of
attempt shall arise:
. . . .

(b) Due to factual or legal
impossibility if the offense could have
been committed had the attendant
circumstances been as the actor believed
them to be.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3)(b) (1990).
4. As discussed later in this opinion, we conclude that there
is sufficient evidence apart from these statements to satisfy
the corpus delicti rule, and therefore, the statements were
admitted properly.
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entire bottle of the substance in his ampicillin capsules was
corroborated by the officers' discovery of oxalic acid under
the sink at her home and tests run on the ampicillin capsules
that showed them to contain oxalic acid. That fact is
sufficient to support a finding of the conduct element of an
attempted intentional killing.*
The final issue to be addressed is the sufficiency
of the evidence of the aggravating circumstances necessary to
raise the murder attempted from second degree to first. The
aggravating circumstances charged were (i) attempting to kill
by administration of oxalic acid, which was either (a) a
"poison" or "a lethal substance" or (b) "a substance
administered in a lethal amount, dosage or quantity," or
(ii) attempting to kill "for the purpose of pecuniary or
other personal gain." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(n); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(f) (1990). We will deal first with
the two-fold issue presented by the oxalic acid. We then
will address the personal gain issue.
Respecting the oxalic acid, the State did not prove
the first of the so-called poison alternatives, i.e., it did
not demonstrate that oxalic acid is a poison or a lethal
substance. There was evidence that oxalic acid in some
unspecified amount may kill, but there was also evidence that
oxalic acid is produced naturally by the body in small
amounts. This state of the evidence is insufficient to
support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that oxalic acid
is a poison or a lethal substance.
The State's second poison alternative was to prove
that the oxalic acid was administered or attempted to be
administered in a "lethal amount, dosage, or quantity." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(n). The problem with the State's case
is that there was no showing at trial as to the quantity of
oxalic acid that would constitute a lethal dose, much less
that Johnson attempted to administer such an amount.
The State responds that under the attempt statute,
failure to demonstrate the lethality of the dosage of oxalic
acid administered or attempted to be administered cannot bar
a conviction for an attempted first degree murder. The State
relies on section 76-4-101(3)(b), which provides that no
defense to a prosecution for attempt arises "[d]ue to factual
or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor
believed them to be." Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3) (b)
5. The fact that impossibility is not a defense under section
76-4-101(3) permits us to find the evidence of a substantial
step sufficient without requiring us to probe into whether
oxalic acid, in the amounts intended to be administered, would
have proven fatal. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(3) (1990).
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(1990). We agree that under this statute factual impossibility generally is no defense to an attempt charge.
However, where the charge is attempted first degree murder,
which is distinguishable under section 76-5-202(1) from
attempted second degree murder only by the presence of
specified objective aggravating circumstances/ the
legislature must have intended that the aggravating
circumstance actually be present. Therefore, a subjective
mistake by the actor as to the presence of an aggravating
circumstance required by section 76-5-202(1) would be a
defense to a charge of attempted first degree murder. Under
such circumstances, the actor can be convicted only of an
attempted intentional killing—attempted second degree murder.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that because the
State failed to prove either that oxalic acid is a poison or
a lethal substance or that Johnson administered or attempted
to administer a quantity of the acid that would have been
lethal, a conviction for attempted first degree murder could
not be supported on the basis of proof of the aggravating
circumstances described in section 76-5-202(1)(n).
This leaves us with the second aggravating
circumstance charged, attempting to kill "for the purpose
of pecuniary or other personal gain." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-202(1)(f). However, before we consider the
sufficiency of the evidence on that issue, we are confronted
with a problem. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the
attempted first degree murder charge without specifying the
aggravating circumstance upon which the verdict was based,
even though it was submitted to the jury on both charged
aggravating circumstances. There is evidence of a motive of
pecuniary gain on Johnson's part. Specifically, there was
testimony that Johnson had wanted to divorce her husband for
two years prior to her arrest but was afraid to do so because
she thought that if she did, he would get half of the
inheritance she received from her father. A motive to
deprive another of what the law might award him or her in the
event of a divorce seems sufficient to make out a case for
application of section 76-5-202(1)(f). One might argue that
we should affirm the attempted first degree murder verdict if
there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt
under either of the aggravating circumstances therein
presented. fi££. State Vt Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 565-68 (Utah
1987) (Hall, C.J., plurality opinion). We conclude, however,
that such an avenue is not open to us here.
In a civil case, we will affirm a general verdict so
long as there is one legally valid theory among those upon
which the case went to the jury and sufficient evidence to
support a verdict on that theory. £££ Cambelt Int'l Corp. v.
Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241-42 (Utah 1987). However, in a
criminal case the rule is to the contrary. A majority of
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this court has stated that a jury must be unanimous on all
elements of a criminal charge for the conviction to stand.
See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 585-88 (Durham, J., concurring &
dissenting); id. at 591 (Zimmerman, J., concurring &
dissenting); id. at 577-80 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
result). From this premise, it follows that a general
verdict of guilty cannot stand if the State's case was
premised on more than one factual or legal theory of the
elements of the crime and any one of those theories is flawed
or lacks the requisite evidentiary foundation. In such
circumstances, it is impossible to determine whether the jury
agreed unanimously on all of the elements of a valid and
evidentially supported theory of the elements of the crime.
In the present case, the jury returned a general
verdict of guilty on each count of attempted first degree
murder. No special verdicts were given that would indicate
upon which aggravating circumstance the jury based the
conviction. Because we cannot determine whether the jury was
unanimous on the elements of the offense based on section
76-5-202(1)(f) alone, the insufficiency of the evidence to
support the State's proof of the section 76-5-202(1)(n)
aggravating circumstance makes it impossible for us to affirm
on the alternative pecuniary gain theory. Therefore, we must
reverse the attempted first degree murder conviction on count
III.
That does not end the matter, however. Section
76-1-402(5) of the Code allows an appellate court to enter a
conviction for a lesser included offense under certain
circumstances. That section provides that if
there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for the offense charged but
. . . there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included
offense and the trier of fact necessarily
found every fact required for conviction of
that included offense, the verdict . . .
may be . . . reversed and a judgment of
conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of new trial, if
such relief is sought by the defendant.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1990). Although technically
Johnson did not seek to reduce the sentence from attempted
first degree murder to the lesser included offense on appeal,
we deem the requirements of the statute satisfied because she
requested that the jury be given a lesser included instruction
and she attacks the conviction for attempted first degree
murder on appeal. She therefore can claim no surprise at
this court's consideration of a lesser included offense.
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In the present casef the only basis we rely upon for
overturning the attempted first degree murder conviction is a
lack of evidence on the aggravating circumstances charged.
However, the other elements of the attempted first degree
murder charge under count III, for which we found ample
evidence to support the verdict of guilt, are identical to
the elements of the lesser included charge of attempted
second degree murder. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202
(1990) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) (1990) (amended
1991). The fact that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain that verdict as to the aggravating circumstance in no
way undermines the finding of the elements necessary for
attempted second degree murder. We therefore direct the
trial court to enter a judgment of conviction for that
offense on count III.6 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5)
(1990); State v. Bolsinaer. 699 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985)
(plurality opinion); State v, PinflfUP, 655 P.2d 674, 676
(Utah 1982).
We now consider Johnson's challenges to her
conviction under count I, which charged her with attempting
to cause the death of her husband by the administration of
heroin. Here, again, the State was required to prove the
same elements: (i) intent or knowledge; (ii) conduct
constituting a substantial step toward the killing; and
(iii) an aggravating circumstance, either (a) that the
attempt was by the administration of a poison or a substance
in a lethal amount or (b) that the attempt was for the
purpose of pecuniary or other personal gain. We find the
evidence sufficient to support the juryfs verdict.
There is ample evidence to support the jury's
verdict that Johnson intended to kill her husband or had
knowledge that her actions, if successful, would result in
death to satisfy the mental element. For example, the
evidence showed that Johnson asked Orozco if she knew of a
drug that could ••overdose someone.H After finding such a
drug, Johnson wanted to obtain a sufficient amount to achieve
6. This case is distinguishable from State v. Bolsinaer, 699
P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), where the court vacated a conviction
for second degree murder and entered a conviction for
manslaughter, an offense that requires a wholly different
mental state. In his separate concurring and dissenting
opinion in that case, Justice Stewart expressed concern that
section 76-1-402(5) would be misapplied if used to enter a
conviction for a lesser included offense that required a
different mens rea than the charged crime. See Bolsinaer, 699
P.2d at 1221 (Stewart, J., concurring & dissenting). No such
situation is present here. The mens rea required for the
lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder is
either identical to or included within that required for
attempted first degree murder.
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the desired result. To that end, she gave Orozco money on
two separate occasions to purchase the required heroin. From
these facts, the jury could reasonably find that Johnson had
the requisite mental state.
There was also evidence that Johnson engaged in
conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of
the crime. In addition to supplying the money to purchase
the drug, Johnson told Vojtecky that she had chopped up the
heroin and given it to her husband in his capsules. There
was confirmatory testimony by her husband that he actually
had taken the heroin-filled capsules. Johnson later admitted
to Orozco that even after giving her husband the heroin, "the
stuff didn't work."
As for proof of the necessary aggravating
circumstance, defense counsel conceded during oral argument
that the administration of the heroin was sufficient to bring
the case within the "poison" or "lethal amount, dosage or
quantity" language of section 76-5-202(n). Additionally, the
evidence supporting the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary
or other personal gain is sufficient for the same reasons
stated with regard to count III. Therefore, there was ample
evidence to support the finding of guilty on count I.
As a second line of attack, Johnson argues that the
State failed to make a prima facie showing of the corpus
delicti necessary to admit her incriminating statements.
Absent the admission of her statements prior to her arrest,
she claims, there was insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for first degree murder.
We first consider the timeliness of the raising of
this issue. Trial counsel failed to preserve this by
objecting to the admission of the statements in a timely
manner. Current counsel first raised the claim in a motion
for a new trial. At that time, the State argued that
counsel's failure to raise the issue earlier waived the
claim. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). However, in disposing
of the new trial motion, the trial judge did not rely on
waiver, but addressed the merits of the issue. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-35-24 (1982) (repealed 1989) (current version at
Utah R. Crim. P. 24). In its order denying the motion, the
court found that Johnson's statements did not fall within the
purview of the corpus delicti rule because the statements
were part of the crime, not confessions:
The State v» Welflon case cited by
Defendant (314 P.2d 353) does not extend
the Corpus Delecti [sic] Rule as it
relates to confessions made by the
Defendant to all statements made by the
Defendant. In this case, the now objected
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to statements **ere wade in connection with
the activity itself, not after arrest and
were not introduced in the form of a
confession but to show -a motive and intent
at the time other actions were taking
place. It is the judgment of this Court
that such statements are admissible as
part of the case in chief and may be used
to show Corpus Delecti [sic].
Because the trial court addressed the corpus delicti issue
fully and did not rely on waiver, we consider the issue on
appeal, even though trial counsel failed to properly preserve
it as required by Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1). See State
v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991). But see State
v. Belaard, 811 P.2d 211, 217 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert,
granted. One of the primary reasons for imposing waiver
rules like rule 103(a)(1) is to assure that the trial court
has the first opportunity to address a claim that it erred.
If the trial court already has had that opportunity, the
justification for rigid waiver requirements is weakened
considerably.
Some might argue that our refusal to find waiver
under these circumstances will give defense counsel a
tactical advantage because they can withhold an objection at
trial and, in the event of an adverse result, still challenge
the admissibility of the evidence in a motion for a new
trial, thus preserving the opportunity to appeal. A clear
understanding of such a tactic points out its perilousness.
For example, the trial court may refuse to consider the
merits of the argument on the motion for new trial because it
may find the issue waived. If so, the issue can be
considered on appeal only if the appellate court concludes
that the admission of the evidence was plain error. State v.
Verde, 770 p.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989); State vt Bullock, 791
p.2d 155, 158 (1989), certt denied,
U.S.
, 110 s. ct.
3270 (1990).
Turning to the merits, the State makes two
arguments. First, it contends, as the trial court apparently
found, that the corpus delicti rule does not apply to
Johnson's statements because they were made during the
commission of a crime. The State would limit the doctrine's
application to post-crime or post-arrest statements or to
statements made when a defendant knows he or she is the focus
of an investigation. Alternatively, the State argues that
even if the corpus delicti rule applies here, it is satisfied
if the court adopts a -trustworthiness- standard as to
evidence of corpus delicti. We will address both of these
arguments.
Initially, we note that the trial court's ruling
that the corpus delicti rule does not bar admission of the
No. 900088
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statements is a question of law, and accordingly, our
standard of review is correctness. E.g., Rollins v.
Petersen. 813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991); Landes v. Capital
Citv Bank. 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). We also note
that because we have reversed the entire conviction on count
II, we consider the corpus delicti question only with respect
to counts I and III.
Our analysis begins with a definition of the corpus
delicti rule and an overview of its scope and operation. The
corpus delicti rule states that before a defendant's
inculpatory statements can be introduced as evidence against
the defendant, the State must prove the occurrence of a
crime, i.e., a corpus delicti. State v. Johnson. 95 Utah
572, 579-80, 83 P.2d 1010, 1014 (1938), overruled on other
grounds. State v. Crank. 105 Utah 332, 355, 142 P.2d 178, 188
(1943). Although the rule traditionally concerns
after-the-fact confessions, the policy underlying the rule's
application is equally applicable to admissions because they
are subject to the same possibilities for error.7 See
Opper v. United States. 348 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1954). The rule
is designed as a "safeguard against convicting the innocent
on the strength of false confessions.** State v. Weldon, 6
Utah 2d 372, 373, 314 P.2d 353, 354 (1957); see also Citv of
Bremerton v. Corbett, 106 Wash. 2d 569, 576, 723 P.2d 1135,
1139 (1986).
Corpus delicti must be established through evidence,
independent of the confession or admission, that "the injury
specified . . . occurred, and that such injury was caused by
someone's criminal conduct."8 State v. Knoefler. 563 P.2d
175, 176 (Utah 1977); see also State v. Calamity. 735 P.2d
39, 41 (Utah 1987); State v. Johnson. 95 Utah at 580-81, 83
7. A confession, as is it is generally understood, is an
"express acknowledgment by a defendant of his [or her] guilt
of the crime with which he [or she] is charged." 29 Am. Jur.
2d Evidence § 523 (1967). An admission, on the other hand,
is an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance from which
guilt may be inferred. Although confessions are also
admissions, they are special types of admissions because they
contain admissions of the criminal act itself and not mere
admissions upon which guilt may be inferred. Id.; see State
v. Karumai. 101 Utah 592, 601, 126 P.2d 1047, 1052 (1942)
(recognizing the distinction between confessions and
admissions).
8. We note that some confusion has arisen surrounding corpus
delicti because the term has more than one use. This case
involves the question of when proof of the crime is required
to allow introduction of a defendant's confession. In another
context, corpus delicti refers to evidence that the crime was
committed. £££ State v. Rebeterano. 681 P.2d 1265, 1267-68
(Utah 1984).
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P.2d at 1014-15. Our past cases have consistently required
that the independent evidence show two things: (i) *[t]hat a
wrong, an injury, or a damage has been done," and (ii) -that
such was effected by a criminal agency, i.e., without right
or by unlawful means.- Johnson, 95 Utah at 580, 83 P.2d at
1014. Under our prior cases, the State is not required to
show independent evidence -that the accused was the guilty
agent.- £££, £ ^ ^ , Calamity, 735 P.2d at 41; Knoefler, 563
P.2d at 176; Weldon, 6 Utah 2d at 376-77, 314 P.2d at 356
(1957); State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 372, 275 P.2d 173, 173
(1954); Johnson, 95 Utah at 580, 83 P.2d at 1040.
We first address the Statefs argument that the
corpus delicti rule does not extend to Johnson*s statements
because they were not -confessions- in the normal sense of
the term since they occurred during the commission of the
crimes charged. A number of federal and state courts
addressing this issue have concluded that the corpus delicti
rule is inapplicable to statements made prior to or during
the commission of a crime. In Warszower v. United States,
312 U.S. 342 (1941), the Supreme Court concluded that
statements made prior to the commission of a crime did not
-contain [any] of the inherent weaknesses of confessions or
admissions after the fact- and, therefore, the corpus delicti
doctrine1s requirement of corroboration was not necessary.
Id. at 347. This position was confirmed in Opper v. United
States, 348 U.S. at 90, 91. See 9lS0 Castillo v. State, 614
P.2d 756, 759 (Alaska 1980); State v. Saltzman, 241 Iowa
1373, 1382, 44 N.W.2d 24, 28-29 (1950); State v. Libbv. 546
A.2d 444, 451 n.6 (Me. 1988); People v. Hamp, 110 Mich. App.
92, 97, 312 N.W.2d 175, 178 (1981). Because this appears to
be the majority position and supported by sound policy, we
follow this approach in this case. Whatever the rule as to
the need for caution in admitting inculpatory statements made
after the crime, there seems little need for extraordinary
protective measures for statements made before or during the
crime's commission.
Before we begin our corpus delicti analysis of the
evidence on counts I and III, we must first address the
quantum of proof necessary to satisfy the corpus delicti rule
and serve as a predicate for the admission of precrime
inculpatory statements. This should help us to determine the
harmfulness of any trial court error in the admission of
precrime inculpatory statements before the independent
evidentiary foundation was laid.
The precise quantum of independent evidence
necessary to satisfy the Utah corpus delicti rule is somewhat
unclear because of inconsistent statements of the standard in
our prior cases. See State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d at 376, 314
P.2d at 357; State v. Ferrv, 2 Utah 2d at 372, 275 P.2d at
173 n.2; State vf Johnson, 95 Utah at 579, 83 p.2d at 1016;
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State v. Wells. 35 Utah 400, 409, 100 P. 681, 684-85 (1909),
overruled on other grounds. State v. Crank, 105 Utah at 352,
142 P.2d at 187. Our initial statements of the standard
required that the independent evidence prove the corpus
delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wells, 35 Utah
at 409, 100 P. at 684. Over time, this standard has been
softened, but it is difficult to determine precisely how much.
In State v. Johnson, 95 Utah at 581, 83 P.2d at
1016, we held that the independent corroborative evidence of
the corpus delicti need only be consistent with and tend to
"confirm and strengthen the confession." Id. at 583, 83 P.2d
at 1016. Although this weakened the standard of Wells, it
did not fix the new standard with any degree of certainty.
We attempted to clarify the matter in State v. Ferrv, 2 Utah
2d at 372, 275 P.2d at 173, when we held that evidence of the
corpus delicti must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. However, this apparently clear standard was
questioned only three years later in State v. Weldon, 6 Utah
2d at 377, 314 P.2d at 356. In Weldon. the opinion of the
majority of the court observed in dictum that the clear and
convincing standard of Ferrv was a more stringent burden than
was required by the purposes underlying the rule and that it
might produce results unduly favorable to defendants. Id.
However, notwithstanding the Weldon majority's criticism of
the Ferrv standard, it recognized that Ferry stated the
applicable standard and required a finding of clear and
convincing evidence of corpus delicti. Id. at 377, 314 P.2d
at 357. It then analyzed the evidence under that standard
and found that the standard was not met.
The State argues that the dicta in Weldon and the
lack of reference to Ferry and its standard in other
post-Ferry cases suggest that we have abandoned the clear and
convincing standard and moved towards a softer
"trustworthiness" standard. See, e.g., State v. Petree. 659
P.2d 443, 444 (1983); State v. Cazier. 521 P.2d 554, 555
(Utah 1974); State v. Weldon, 6 Utah at 377, 314 P.2d at
354. As noted above, however, only dicta in Weldon supports
the State's argument. Other cases relied upon by the State
do little to bolster its position. For example, although
language in Cazier arguably phrases the standard in softer
terms than Ferry, it is clear from the opinion that the
evidence was sufficient to meet the clear and convincing
standard of Ferry. Finally, any reliance on Petree is
misplaced because it deals with the proof of "corpus delicti"
in the context of an examination into the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence to support a guilty verdict on a
murder charge and not the independent evidence needed to
satisfy the corpus delicti rule on the admission of postcrime
inculpatory statements. See Petree, 659 P.2d at 447.
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In summary, our review of the post-Ferry cases does
not convince us that the court has moved away from the Ferry
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard,9
We turn now to an examination of the correctness of
the trial court's corpus delicti ruling on the motion for a
new trial. Because Johnson made statements that potentially
create corpus delicti concerns in both counts I and III, we
will analyze the counts separately. With respect to count I,
charging attempted murder by the use of heroin, the evidence
shows that prior to the administration of the heroin, Johnson
made statements indicating that she wanted to use it to
overdose her husband. Under the pre- and posterime
distinction adopted above, these remarks were not covered by
the corpus delicti rule and were admissible as statements
against interest. However, incriminating statements after
she administered the heroin to her husband are subject to the
corpus delicti rule. Included are Johnson's statement to
Officer Vojtecky that she had given her husband heroin on
January 21, 1989, and her statement to Cindy Orozco that the
H
stuff didn't work." The trial court's ruling that these
admissions were not subject to the corpus delicti rule was
incorrect.
Even though the court erred in admitting the
evidence under the basis it stated, however, the error was
harmless. An examination of the evidence of the corpus
delicti on count I clearly establishes that it was sufficient
to establish corpus delicti, even without these latter
statements. Under the Utah corpus delicti rule, before
postcrime inculpatory statements are admissible, the State
must show by clear and convincing evidence that (i) a wrong
was done and (ii) such wrong was the result of criminal
conduct. See, e.g., State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d at 41; State
v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d at 176; Johnson, 95 Utah at 580-81, 83
P.2d at 1014-15. The first part of the corpus delicti test
is met here, i.e., there is clear and convincing independent
evidence of a wrong. Peggy Johnson stated that she wanted to
purchase the heroin so that she could kill her husband with
it. The heroin was purchased and delivered to her on
January 21. There was also physical evidence that Johnson
had placed harmful substances, including oxalic acid, in her
husband's medicine on other occasions. Danny testified that
five hours after taking his capsules on the night of
January 21-22, he was dizzy and sweaty. He also testified
that he vomited at that time. Danny's symptoms were
consistent with the ingestion of heroin.
9. Because we conclude that the evidence in this case is
sufficient under Ferry to satisfy the corpus delicti rule,
there is no occasion for us to address the "trustworthiness"
standard pressed upon us by the State. See State v. Parker,
315 N.C. 222, 236, 337 S.E.2d 487, 495 (1985).
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There is likewise sufficient evidence to satisfy the
second part of the corpus delicti test—that the wrong was
caused by unlawful means. The same evidence supporting part
one of the test also supports part two. Taken as a whole,
this evidence is sufficient under Ferry to support the
inference that the heroin was placed in the capsules and that
they produced the violent physical reaction by Johnson's
husband. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to
constitute clear and convincing proof of the corpus delicti
of count I. Therefore, even though the trial judge may have
erred in concluding that Johnson's postcrime statements
regarding the administration of heroin in the capsules were
not covered by the corpus delicti rule, any such error was
harmless. Ample evidence for a foundation for the
admissibility of those statements was adduced, even if not in
the proper order.
Turning to count III, attempted murder through the
administration of oxalic acid, all Johnson's statements were
subject to the corpus delicti rule because they were made
after she had administered the drug. Again, the trial court
erred when it admitted the evidence without first making a
determination that the corpus delicti rule was satisfied.
Nevertheless, as is the case with count I, we conclude that
there was sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to allow
the admission of Johnson's statements, and therefore, the
error was harmless.
The two elements to be proven under the corpus
delicti rule are a wrong and linkage to criminal agency. In
the case of oxalic acid, the wrong is the fact of the
administration of oxalic acid. There is ample evidence that
it was administered to Danny Johnson. A bottle was found in
Johnson's home that contained the same substance found in the
capsules Danny was taking. Danny also testified that when he
took the capsules they upset his stomach and, on one occasion,
burned his throat. As for the criminal agency, the presence
of the substance in the ampicillin capsules without Danny's
knowledge is sufficient proof. Here, as with count I, any
error in admitting the postcrime inculpatory statements
before finding the corpus delicti rule satisfied was harmless.
Johnson's conviction on count I is affirmed. Her
conviction on count III is vacated and replaced with a
conviction for attempted second degree murder. Finally, her
conviction on count II is reversed.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Christine M, Durham, Justice

No. 900088

20

